Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. The last three combat opera tions since the first gulf war ratifies the ideas postulated in the concept of Rapid Decisive Operations, and appear to justify the force sizing choices made in the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review. However, post conflict operations were never included as part of the force sizing calculus. Paradoxically it now takes more ground force to secure the peace in post conflict than to bring an end to decisive operations. This paper will examine the paradox created by the "New American Way of War" and the increased need for ground forces to secure the peace compared to conducting decisive operations. To explore this paradox, the analysis will focus on the period of time in a campaign when decisive operations transition from conflict termination to post conflict stability operations. 
SWIFTLY DEFEAT THE EFFORTS: THEN WHAT? THE "NEW AMERICAN WAY OF WAR" AND TRANSITIONING DECISIVE COMBAT TO POST CONFLICT STABILIZATION
This revision resulted in a new force sizing construct that mandated that "…forces be shaped to defend the United States; Deter aggression and coercion forward in four critical regions; swiftly defeat aggression in overlapping major conflicts while preserving for the President the option to call for a decisive victory in one of those conflicts-including the possibility of regime change or occupation; and conduct a limited number of smaller scale contingency operations."
4
The new concept of swiftly defeat the efforts of an adversary was embraced, in large part, on the hope that this would yield force savings with no discernable risk. 5 The last three combat operations undertaken by the United States in the period since the first gulf war ratifies the ideas postulated in the concept of Rapid Decisive Operations, and appears to justify the force sizing choices made in the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review.
However, post conflict operations was never included as part of the force sizing calculus. The notion of Rapid Decisive Operations was one of "hit and run" rather than "fight and stay." Yet fight and stay is precisely what happened in Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq. Paradoxically it now takes more ground force to secure the peace in post conflict than to bring an end to decisive operations. 6 This would not be much of a problem were it not for the rules associated with the Quadrennial Defense Review force sizing construct which allows forces to be sized only for the conduct of decisive operations. All other force structure is considered "lesser included" and would be considered, for analytical purposes, to be extracted from a stability operation to conduct decisive operations. 7 However, during Operation Iraqi Freedom the United States did not extract forces from ongoing stability operations in the Sinai, Bosnia, Kosovo, or Afghanistan.
The post-conflict operations that the United States Army is committed to now exceeds the amount of force sized to meet the decisive operations needs envisioned under the two Major Theater War Concept. A force improperly sized can lead to symptoms of increased force stress causing decreased readiness, increased retention problems, and larger institutional problems if not corrected in the mid term. This paper will examine the paradox created by the "New American Way of War," as represented by the concept of Rapid Decisive Operations, and the increased need for ground forces to secure the peace compared to conducting decisive operations. To examine this paradox, the primary focus will be the period of time in a campaign when decisive operations transition from conflict termination to post conflict stability operations. The concepts explored in the previous sections will be compared to the cases of Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq to provide conclusions and recommendations than may be used in future force sizing discussions in the 2005 Quadrennial Defense Review.
A NEW AMERICAN WAY OF WAR
The "New American Way of War," as described by Max Boot in Foreign Affairs, is a method of war characterized by rapid maneuver, and precision firepower to achieve quick victory with minimum casualties. This new style of warfare puts a premium on flexibility and surprise, and relies on special operations forces to a much greater extent than in times past. The "Emerging American Way of War," showcases Special Operations Forces operating with local knowledge from remote locations, and applying information-age technology to leverage networked precision capabilities to achieve strategic effects. These forces are assisted by units capable of nation building and constabulary operations upon the end of strike operations to free the elite forces for other missions. This vision exhibits speed in execution of operations, and increasing precision of operational effects to limit an adversary's strategic choices.
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The "Emerging American Way of War," through the use of Network Centric operations, provides the promise of less land forces in contact with the enemy during decisive operations.
This concept goes so far as to say that the United States "endeavors to keep the ground forces'
"footprint" as economical as possible." 14 This is possible since the joint force "aims for rapid dominance of any battlefield it may enter so the initial blows come from the air." 15 This is the connection the authors of the "Emerging American Way of War" make with the concepts of Rapid Dominance and Rapid Decisive Operations. In these concepts minimal ground forces will be used to "roll up enemy ground forces that have been softened by air attacks and to occupy terrain." 16 Cebrowski and Barnett are largely mute about the issue of ground forces needed to secure the peace. As described earlier they envision a constabulary and nation building force to allow for elite forces to exit upon completion of decisive operations. The notion is that there will be a clear delineation between decisive combat and post conflict operations. The concept of securing and occupying terrain and controlling the adversary populace is really not explored in any meaningful way other than the assumption that limited land force will be required to secure the peace due to the decisive nature of Network Centric Rapid Decisive Operations. They envision a short stabilization period due to passing off the security of the countryside to the local constabulary or to other national peacekeeping forces. 17 Cebrowski and Barnett further elaborate on this concept as part of their ideas for the employment of ground forces in which the Army maintains the peace as a "premier long-term occupation force." The Army will maintain the peace only until the United States can transition the post conflict stability duties to international or local civilian rule.
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What emerges from the Office of Force Transformation's view of the "New American Way of War" is somewhat different from that of Max Boot's. Their view is that due to the changing nature of war there will be limited need for ground forces during decisive operations. One may assume their view is that the same amount of ground forces needed for success during decisive operations, can be used for the post conflict.
OPERATIONALIZING THE "NEW AMERICAN WAY OF WAR"
The Joint Forces Command took the ideas of Rapid Dominance and developed the concept of Rapid Decisive Operations. 19 The Rapid Decisive Operations concept will serve as the blueprint for future concept development and experimentation. 20 Rapid Decisive
Operations, as described in the whitepaper, integrates knowledge, command and control, and operations, while leveraging other elements of national power, to enable the United States and its allies to attack asymmetrically an adversary from different directions and in different dimensions. These operations will so overpower an adversary in a variety of ways that he will lose coherence, will realize he cannot achieve his objectives and thus will capitulate or will ultimately be defeated. 21 Yet the ideas of Rapid Decisive Operations reflect the hallmarks of the "New American Way of War" as outlined by the Office of Defense Transformation with the emphasis on speed, networked command and control, enabling the application of effects based operations at the lowest level to achieve decisive results.
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The concept for Rapid Decisive Operations, while described as simultaneous and parallel in its characteristics, envisions a sequential and serial post conflict transition. The forces that will be required for the transition may or may not be available to the Joint Force Commander since the white paper concept does not address the transition to post conflict and conflict termination. The White Paper never really addresses the need for the Joint Force Commander to simultaneously fight decisive operations while securing the peace. Combat Operations is for the Joint Force to bring conflict with a regional nation state to decisive conclusion through the use of swiftly executed, simultaneous and sequentially applied power in a contiguous or non-contiguous manner. 24 The characteristics of how the Joint Forces
Command view the future conduct of Major Combat Operations is to employ a knowledgeenhanced, effects-based approach, applying relentless pressure, and engaging the adversary comprehensively. The Joint Force will accomplish this by using collaborative processes, aligning deployment, employment, and sustainment actions, protecting the Joint Force throughout the battlespace. The Joint Force will start a Major Combat Operation with a strategic purpose in mind to achieve decisive conclusions.
25
The Major Combat Operations concept thus assumes that a coherent enemy force remains at the end of combat operations that will capitulate to U.S. terms of conflict termination.
There is no mention of simultaneous conduct of decisive combat along with stability operations or security operations to impose our will upon an adversary that is no longer a coherent fighting formation but has decomposed into guerrilla bands or terrorist cells. The concept makes mention of ideas for post conflict: "Successfully imposing our will on an adversary whose behavior brought us to engage him in combat operations may very well rest upon what we do after we have forcefully and successfully engaged an adversary's ability to resist." 26 The unstated assumption is that decisive operations have brought relative stability to the region.
There was no mention of the chaos created in the wake of decisive operations due to a power vacuum created by the swift disintegration of an enemy force. In short there is no meaningful treatment of transition of decisive operations to post-conflict stability operations.
TRANSITIONING FROM DECISIVE OPERATIONS TO POST CONFLICT OPERATIONS
The The Joint Operating Concept for stability operations envisions a "Stability Force" separate and distinct from a combat force, to include a separate and distinct commander for this force.
The purpose of this force will be two-fold during combat: to ensure continued momentum of the decisive combat operations, and to create conditions that will ensure the long term success of the post-conflict operations. The stability force will then transition to post-conflict actions, following decisive combat operations, that will focus on assisting the inter-agency, international community and local government by conducting security operations and civil-military operations in "restorative" stability operations. 28 Much of this concept calls for an organization and force structure that is separate and distinct from the force structure and organizations that execute the Major Combat Operations. 29 Therefore, the Joint Force Command Concept is looking to a constabulary force concept, a force structure, and organizations separate and distinct from conventional operational forces to conduct the post-conflict operations. This concept compliments a proposal published by the Center for Technology and National Security Policy at the National Defense University.
In These are all questions dealing with the transition to post conflict operations that a variety of researchers have asked. Consensus amongst these researchers is that the main task that military forces must accomplish rather quickly in transitioning from decisive operations to postconflict operations is to provide security to enable the inter-agency, the international community, and local authorities to re-establish services and governance.
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In A Wiser Peace, researchers from the Center for Strategic and International Studies recommend that to ensure a successful transition from decisive combat operations to post conflict, the United States should not underestimate the needs for security in post conflict.
Deficiencies in security forces were endemic in post conflict Afghanistan and to a lesser extent post conflict Kosovo. 35 They argue that a post conflict security force should be part of any combined coalition force that leads combat operations. Unity of effort for the security forces as they transition from decisive operations to post conflict should ensure swift deployment of adequate security forces to eliminate the possibility of any power vacuums in the wake of swift decisive operations. 36 The authors envision that a "constabulary" force would complete these tasks. They assumed that this force would focus on civil security, primarily policing common crime, not conducting operations against guerrillas or terrorists in an asymmetric conflict. They recommend that the adversary's army be disarmed, purged of undesirables, and retrained by coalition combat forces to meet internal and external instability needs. Until such time as that force was prepared to assume this mission the coalition combat forces would have to be prepared to meet those missions. 37 Thus combat forces would be required if instability exists and local indigenous capability were not available. These combat forces would be an integral part of the coalition forces for unity of effort and assume these missions as soon as decisive operations transition to post-conflict operations or may be simultaneous with decisive operations.
In America's Role in Nation Building: from Germany to Iraq, researchers from the RAND Corporation examined post-conflict operations that the United States conducted from Germany and Japan to Iraq. The researchers conclude that in the transition from Decisive Operations to Post Conflict one of the most important considerations will be security. Their research concludes that there is an inverse correlation between the size of the stabilization force and risk.
The higher proportion of stabilization force appears to reduce the number of casualties taken in the post-conflict. 38 Indeed, the researchers from Rand discovered that: "It seems that the more swift and bloodless the military victory, the more difficult post conflict stabilization can be."
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Thus the "New American Way of War" may create the conditions that require more forces to succeed in post conflict than is required for success in decisive operations.
Two differences between the concepts and actual practice, as represented by the RAND and the CSIS study, stand out. First, the use of specialized fixed organization constabulary forces, rather than conventional combat forces, with the proper capabilities in the right numbers to meet the mission sets as determined by the Coalition Commander on the ground. Second, the idea of a separate Joint Command for stabilization in post-conflict, rather than the Joint Force Commander simultaneously transitioning from decisive operations to post-conflict operations. Finally, there is one other difference between the two concepts and the review of the historical record. The historical record suggests that a larger ground force is required to provide security during the transition from decisive combat to post-conflict than required to be successful during decisive combat operations. The two concepts to establish stability forces, on the other hand, envision no need for additional combat forces for success. In fact, the two concepts assume that lighter forces may be successful in modern post-conflict operations.
TRANSITIONING FROM DECISIVE COMBAT TO POST-CONFLICT STABILIZATION: THREE CASE STUDIES
To evaluate the differences between the actual practice in transition from decisive operations to post-conflict stabilization and the proposed concepts to accomplish stabilization under the "New American Way of War" three operations will be examined. The transition to post-conflict security from decisive operations was less successful and its second and third order effects continue to plague Afghanistan to this day. There was never a full recognition that post-conflict security was an integral part of the transition from decisive operations and that these actions should occur simultaneously or near-simultaneously. Instead, a separate organization was established in the form of ISAF and employed about a month after decisive combat in Kabul occurred, allowing a gap in security to form. This gap has never fully been closed, to the point of placing post-conflict reconstruction efforts and political actions, such as elections, in jeopardy. 58 The military forces committed to the post conflict security effort were limited by design. A month after the fall of Kabul the Secretary of Defense was questioned about deploying peacekeeping forces to Afghanistan:
Could peacekeepers be deployed within the next 10 days without interfering with your operations? My feeling is that you don't get peacekeeping until you get peace. I like to refer to it as a security force. I don't think that it will have to be a terribly big one. The only place they are talking about having it is in Kabul, the capital. Most of the other places are relatively calm. There is still fighting and lawlessness, but this is true in some American cities as well.
59
The post-conflict security force represented a ratio of one military member for every 1, 730 residents. 60 The deliberate under-resourcing of post-conflict security and placing the effort under a separate command that arrived late may be one of the factors that are keeping the peace from being secured in Afghanistan. The limited number of ground forces required to achieve decisive victory actually served as an impediment to the rapid implementation of post-conflict security. The force that CENTCOM and CFLCC originally planned to achieve the operational endstate of a safe and secure Iraq was five divisions organized under the V U.S. Corps, and the Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF). The size of the force that actually conducted the operation was a little over three divisions. 67 This translated to about 151,000 coalition soldiers and marines in the land forces during the transition to post-conflict stability, which represented one solider or marine for every 164 Iraqi residents. Therefore, rapidly transitioning to post conflict security simultaneously, or near simultaneously, was difficult since the forces required to follow and support, or follow and assume, the mission to secure by-passed territory, or bypassed forces, were not available in sufficient quantities to conduct those operations. Indeed when it came time to secure key civilian institutions in Baghdad the CFLCC commander, upon completion of decisive combat operations, would not be able to meet all the post conflict security missions Thus the latest war in the pattern of the "New American Way of War" demonstrated that the rapid nature of decisive combat operations requires more ground forces to secure the post conflict peace than it does to achieve decisive victory.
OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM-IRAQ

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The "New American Way of War" cannot deliver on the promise of reduced ground forces that the authors of the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review hoped for. In the drive to swiftly defeat the efforts of an adversary and return conditions to status quo ante bellum American forces will require more ground forces to secure the peace than to complete decisive combat operations. Indeed, to conduct a win decisive campaign in a major combat operation the United
States will require more ground forces to remove a regime. Two lessons regarding the transition to post-conflict security emerge from the recent past.
To effectively secure the post conflict peace, an overwhelming combat force is required.
In In order to provide the Joint Force Commander the right capabilities needed to transition to post conflict security in future decisive operations the following recommendations should be considered:
• Properly resource the land component commander responsible to conduct decisive operations with combat formations that can follow and assume security missions for bypassed enemy and to provide presence on occupied terrain. The amount of force sized to secure the peace in Operation Allied Force could serve as a good rule of thumb, which was one ground combatant for every one hundred residents.
• Place post-conflict security forces under the command of the land component commander for unity of command. Additional specialized forces such as civil affairs, military police, and engineers may be task organized to the combat formations to assume some post-conflict civil reconstruction, police, and infrastructure repair missions until the security situation allows a transition to international, local, or nongovernmental solutions. This step will eliminate the need for a separate Joint Stability Force Organization, since the Land Component Commander will have the right capabilities to secure the peace in parallel with decisive combat operations.
• Adjust the rules for force sizing in the next Quadrennial Defense Review to allow for the sizing of a potentially larger post-conflict ground security force in comparison to the ground force required for success in decisive combat operations. This should be additive force structure rather than a lesser included force structure.
Implementing these recommendations may provide the future joint force commander the right capabilities to ensure that winning the decisive victory includes securing the peace. A full understanding of the way "The New American Way of War" has transformed the nature of war may help in visualizing the reality that more ground force is now required to secure the peace than to conduct decisive combat. 19 Ulman et. al. The seeds for the "New American Way of War" were planted in 1996 by a group of military theorists from the National Defense University and outlined in, Shock and Awe: Achieving Rapid Dominance. The concept of Rapid Dominance was developed in response to the changing strategic environment of the post-cold war period. This environment was one of increasing technological change and diversification of strategic threats. One of the main drivers behind the concept of Rapid Dominance was to be able to change the old two Major Regional Contingency (MRC) force structure and replace it with one that was more fiscally efficient. Through the use of perfect, or near perfect, situational awareness on the battlefield more efficient forces may be used to defeat or destroy and adversary on the battlefield. p. 4
Very little description about what to do after decisive operations is outlined in the concept of Rapid Dominance. The concept envisioned by the authors is such that "Rapid Dominance seeks to impose (in extreme cases) the non-nuclear equivalent of the impact that the atomic weapons dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki had on the Japanese." pg. 12 Therefore, with the implementation of Rapid Dominance, decisive victory will entail small forces on the ground with near perfect information and intelligence directing and applying lethal and non-lethal effects against an adversary that will be so overwhelmed physically and psychologically that they will capitulate to your will. The transition to post-conflict is therefore just a matter of moving a relatively benign constabulatory force to occupy an adversary's territory for a small period of time until a handover to local or international authority could occur. While the authors of Rapid dominance never really address the transition to post conflict the metaphor that Hiroshima and Nagasaki provide suggests there will be a relatively rapid transition to post conflict without a messy transition that may involve more ground forces to secure the peace that were required to fight decisive operations. 21 Ibid, v . Rapid Decisive Operations, as outlined in the White Paper, envisions decisiveness by imposing our will on an adversary through breaking his coherence and defeating his will and ability to fight. Friendly forces will use the concepts of Rapid Decisive Operations through knowledge of the enemy critical vulnerabilities; effects based planning and execution; use of information superiority; dominant maneuver; and precision engagement to synchronize precision effects to generate relentless overwhelming shock on the adversary. As envisioned in the White Paper, Rapid Decisive Operations are focused on rapid resolution and "not designed for long-term commitment or to resolve long-standing problems. A rapid decisive operation creates the desired outcome itself or it establishes the conditions to transition to a higher (e.g., major regional contingency) or lower (e.g., security and stability operation) level of commitment." Rapid Decisive Operations highlight a knowledge-enabled; effects based force that will use precision effects to generate relentless overwhelming shock on the adversary. As with Rapid Decisive Operations the Joint Operating Concept for Major Combat Operations is scant on details on how a Joint Force would transition from decisive operations to post conflict operations. The Joint Operating Concept envisions that the Joint Force, if it implements the concept fully, will "use decisive defeat of enemy combat forces as a means to achieve decisive conclusion to war." 26 Ibid, 57. 33 Ibid, 67. 
